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E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: FR
SUBJECT: ELECTIONS 1978: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE
FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY

1. SUMMARY: DESPITE THE BREAK-UP OF THE COMMON

PROGRAM, THERE CONTINUES TO BE A POSSIBILITY THAT THE LEFT COULD WIN THE MARCH LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS, THUS BRINGING TO POWER A COALITION INCLUDING THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY (PCF). THE PCF WOULD NOT HOLD THE FOREIGN AFFAIRS OR DEFENSE POSTS IN A LEFT COALITION, BUT WOULD NONETHELESS SEEK TO INFLUENCE FOREIGN AND DEFENSE POLICIES AND, IN THE LONGER RUN, TO CONTROL THEM. THIS TELEGRAM REVIEWS THE CURRENT FOREIGN POLICY OF THE PCF, AND CONCLUDES THAT, DESPITE AN APPARENT EVOLUTION ON SOME ISSUES, PCF FOREIGN POLICY REMAINS THE MOST INIMICAL TO US INTERESTS OF ANY MAJOR FRENCH PARTY. THE PCF STRESSES FRENCH INDEPENDENCE AND, GIVEN ITS WAY, WOULD MOVE FRANCE TOWARD A MORE NEUTRALIST STANCE. IT IS OSTENSIBLY COMMITTED TO REMAINING IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE BUT WOULD WORK FOR EVENTUAL DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY BLOCS WITH EMPHASIS ON PAN-EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS. IT WOULD BE ACTIVE AND OFTEN UNHELPFUL ON DISARMAMENT AND WOULD RETAIN AN INDEPENDENT "TOUS AZIMUTS" NUCLEAR FORCE. THE US REMAINS ITS FAVORITE WHIPPING-BOY, AND - EXCEPT WHERE ITS DOMESTIC OBJECTIVES ARE AFFECTED - ITS FOREIGN POLICY REMAINS CONSISTENT WITH THAT OF THE SOVIET UNION. END SUMMARY.

2. THE PCF IS THE MOST RECALCITRANT AND TRADITIONAL
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OF THE THREE MAJOR "EUROCOMMUNIST" PARTIES. WHILE IT IS GOING THROUGH A PERIOD OF TRANSITION, CHANGES OF POLICY HAVE COME ONLY GRUDGINGLY AND THIS, COUPLED WITH THE HARDLINE STANCE TAKEN RECENTLY IN NEGOTIATIONS ON THE COMMON PROGRAM, HAS LEFT MANY OBSERVERS DISTRUSTFUL OF THE PARTY'S REAL INTENTIONS. IN ADDITION, MANY OF THE PCF'S POSITIONS, ESPECIALLY IN THE FOREIGN POLICY FIELD, ARE GENERAL AND OPEN TO INTERPRETATION. THE PARTY HAS FOUND IT EXPEDIENT TO TAKE CLEARER POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF KEY FOREIGN POLICY ISSUES, IN SOME CASES REVEALING AN EVOLUTION AWAY FROM STRICT ADHERENCE TO THE SOVIET LINE. CURRENT PCF FOREIGN POLICY IS BASED ON A MIXTURE OF NATIONALISM, MARXIST IDEOLOGY AND A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS - IT STRESSES FRENCH INDEPENDENCE, THE DISSOLUTION OF POLITICO-MILITARY BLOCS, AND COOPERATION WITH THE EAST AND THE THIRD WORLD.

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3. INDEPENDENCE -- AN EMPHASIS ON NATIONAL INDEPENDENCE IS STANDARD ACROSS THE POLITICAL SPECTRUM IN FRANCE, AND IT IS UNDERSTANDABLE THAT THE PCF SHOULD FEEL A NEED TO STRESS THIS THEME TO OFFSET ITS PAST IMAGE AS MOSCOW-CONTROLLED. THE PCF'S PURSUIT OF FRENCH INDEPENDENCE WITHIN A LEFTIST GOVERNMENT WOULD PROVIDE SOME INSURANCE THAT IT WOULD NOT AUTOMATICALLY FOLLOW MOSCOW'S LINE, BUT IT WOULD ALSO MEAN THAT FRANCE WOULD BE EVEN MORE RELUCTANT THAN IT NOW IS TO ACCEPT US LEADERSHIP. IN FACT, THE THRUST FOR GREATER FRENCH INDEPENDENCE WOULD BE DIRECTED PRIMARILY AGAINST THE US AND WOULD MEAN MORE PROTECTIONIST ECONOMIC POLICIES AS WELL AS A MORE PRONOUNCED TENDENCY TO DIFFERENTIATE FRENCH FROM US POLICIES. IN MOVING FRANCE FROM A POSITION OF LOYAL BUT INDEPENDENT MEMBER OF THE WESTERN FAMILY OF NATIONS TO A MORE NEUTRALIST POSITION, THE PCF WOULD FAVOR CONCLUDING NON-AGGRESSION PACTS WITH WARSAW PACT MEMBERS. HOWEVER, THE PARTY LEADERSHIP IS AWARE THAT DRAMATIC CHANGES IN FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY COULD BRING A BACKLASH AMONG FRANCE'S ALLIES WHICH WOULD MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT FOR THE PARTY TO PURSUE ITS PLANNED DOMESTIC POLICIES. "A TENSE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT", PCF FOREIGN AFFAIRS SPOKESMAN JEAN KANAPA WROTE IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS, "WOULD MAKE IT MUCH MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRAMS OF THE LEFT IN FRANCE."

4. DISSOLUTION OF THE MILITARY BLOCS -- THIS HAS LONG BEEN A GUIDING PRINCIPLE OF PCF POLICY, IN KEEPING WITH THE SOVIET PROPAGANDA LINE. IT IGNORES, OF

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COURSE, THE FACT THAT DISSOLUTION WOULD PROVIDE A ONE-SIDED ADVANTAGE TO THE SOVIETS, WHOSE HOLD OVER THEIR ALLIES IS BASED, NOT ON THE WARSAW PACT, BUT ON A SERIES OF BILATERAL ALLIANCES AND ON HEGEMONIAL MILITARY CONTROL OVER MOST OF EASTERN EUROPE. IN THE NEGOTIATION OF THE COMMON PROGRAM WITH THE SOCIALISTS THE PCF ACCEPTED A POSITION CALLING FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF EXISTING FRENCH ALLIANCES UNTIL THE BLOCS ARE DISMANTLED. AS RECENTLY AS OCTOBER 13 PCF SEC GEN GEORGES MARCHAIS REITERATED IN LE MONDE THAT "WE INTEND TO RESPECT EXISTING FRENCH ALLIANCES, INCLUDING THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE." HOWEVER, COMMUNIST ACCEPTANCE OF THE ALLIANCE IS GRUDGING; KANAPA HAS STATED THAT, WHILE THE PCF WOULD NOT ASK TO RENEGOTIATE THE ATLANTIC TREATY, IT WOULD BE

WILLING TO DO SO IF OTHER ALLIES WISHED.
MOREOVER, THE PCF HAS ANNOUNCED THAT IT WOULD END
ALL THE COOPERATIVE FRENCH-NATO MEASURES WHICH HAVE
BEEN DISCREETLY DEVELOPED UNDER THE POMPIDOU AND
GISCARD REGIMES, AND WHICH THE COMMUNICSTS CLAIM HAVE
RESULTED IN A "DE FACTO REINSERTION" OF FRANCE
INTO NATO. GIVEN THEIR NEGATIVE TILT TOWARD NATO,
THE FRENCH COMMUNISTS COULD BE EXPECTED TO WORK
WITHIN THE ALLIANCE IN FAVOR OF DETENTE INITIATIVES
WHICH THEY SEE AS HELPING TO BRING ABOUT A
DISSOLUTION OF THE BLOCS.

5. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION -- THE PCF'S CONCEPTION
OF A POLICY OF INDEPENDENCE IS ONE UNDER WHICH FRANCE
WOULD BE MUCH MORE ACTIVE IN PROMOTING POLITICAL
AND MILITARY DETENTE AND A "STABLE PEACE" IN EUROPE
THAN IT IS AT THE PRESENT TIME. FRENCH COMMUNISTS
HAVE CONTINUOUSLY ATTACKED THE GISCARD GOVERNMENT
FOR ITS ALLEGED LACK OF INTERNATIONAL INITIATIVES.
THE PCF WOULD SEEK A ROLE OF INNOVATION AND INTERNATION-
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AL LEADERSHIP, IN COOPERATION WITH OTHER STATES. IN
MOST CASES THIS MORE ACTIVE STANCE WOULD WORK TO THE
DISADVANTAGE OF THE WEST. THE PCF HAS NOT BEEN
VERY SPECIFIC, BUT COULD BE EXPECTED TO PRESS FOR
ATMOSPHERIC DETENTE INITIATIVES SIMILAR TO THOSE
ADVANCED BY THE USSR. THIS IMPRESSION IS REINFORCED
BY MARCHAIS' INSISTENCE THAT ALLEGIANCE TO A BLOC
RESTRICTS FRANCE'S FREEDOM OF INITIATIVE; GREATER
INDEPENDENCE WOULD PRESUMABLY PERMIT INITIATIVES
WHICH WERE NOT WHOLLY IN KEEPING WITH THE INTERESTS
OF FRANCE'S ALLIES. THE PCF FAVORS MAINTAINING DIPLO-
MATIC RELATIONS WITH ALL COUNTRIES, EVEN SUCH
"REACTIONARY" REGIMES AS CHILE, ALTHOUGH THE LEVEL
AND QUALITY OF THESE RELATIONS WOULD VARY GREATLY.

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6. DEFENSE -- DESPITE THE LIP SERVICE TO KEEPING
FRANCE IN THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE, PCF THINKING ON
MANY PRACTICAL DEFENSE ISSUES EMPHASIZES INDEPEND-
ENCE IN WAYS WHICH GO BEYOND TRADITIONAL GAULLIST
THINKING. THERE ARE ALSO AREAS IN WHICH POLICY IS
ILL-DEFINED OR SELF-CONTRADICTORY. FOR EXAMPLE, THE
COMMUNISTS ADVOCATE DEVELOPMENT OF AN INDEPENDENT
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM, INCLUDING CONSTRUCTION OF
OBSERVATION SATELLITES AND AIRCRAFT EQUIPPED WITH

DETECTION RADAR, PLUS CONTINUED MODERNIZATION OF THE FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE, BUT THEY ARGUE THAT THIS CAN BE DONE WITHOUT ANY INCREASE IN THE DEFENSE BUDGET THROUGH MORE EFFICIENT USE OF RESOURCES AND NATIONALIZATION OF THE ARMS INDUSTRY. THE PCF IS OPPOSED TO ANY FORM OF JOINT EUROPEAN DEFENSE, ESPECIALLY ANY ARRANGEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE THE FRG ACCESS TO OR CONTROL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT THE PCF'S ATTITUDE WOULD BE TOWARD SUCH CURRENT NATO PROBLEMS AS INTEROPERABILITY AND STANDARDIZATION OF WEAPONRY; THE DESIRE NOT TO INCREASE THE PRESENT LEVEL OF DEFENSE SPENDING WOULD APPEAR TO CONFLICT WITH THE COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENCE -- IN THIS CASE AN INDEPENDENT FRENCH ARMS INDUSTRY.

7. THE SOVIET UNION -- THE PCF'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE USSR IS BASICALLY ONE OF ADMIRATION, PARTICULARLY FOR ITS ECONOMIC ACCOMPLISHMENTS, BUT THIS ATTITUDE IS NONETHELESS AMBIVALENT. THE PARTY HAS PUBLICLY EXPRESSED DISSATISFACTION WITH SOVIET BEHAVIOR ON SEVERAL ISSUES, SUCH AS HUMANRIGHTS, SOVIET EFFORTS TO CONTROL THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST MOVEMENT, AND

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MOSCOW'S TENDENCY TO TILT TOWARD THE RIGHT IN INTERNAL FRENCH POLITICS; THE PCF HAS EVEN QUESTIONED WHETHER THE USSR IS REALLY A SOCIALIST SOCIETY. HOWEVER, THESE ATTITUDES UNDOUBTEDLY ORIGINATED LARGELY IN THE PARTY'S DOMESTIC NEEDS; IT IS OPEN TO SERIOUS QUESTION WHETHER THE PARTY HAS CHANGED IN ANY FUNDAMENTAL WAY. THE PCF IS MORE SELECTIVE IN ITS POLICIES IN SOME OTHER AREAS, (E.G. ARMS CONTROL), CHOOSING AN INDEPENDENT COURSE WHEN THIS APPEARS ADVANTAGEOUS DOMESTICALLY, BUT FOLLOWING A LINE WHICH IS BROADLY COMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET OBJECTIVES. ON ISSUES OF LESS IMMEDIATE CONCERN TO FRENCH VOTERS (E.G. THIRD WORLD ISSUES) THE PARTY IS TOTALLY FAITHFUL TO SOVIET POSITIONS. IT IS THUS APPARENT THAT THE PCF IS NOT MOSCOW-CONTROLLED, BUT ITS POLICIES ARE STRONGLY INFLUENCED BY SOVIET VIEWS, ESPECIALLY WHEN THERE ARE NO OVER-RIDING DOMESTIC CONSIDERATIONS. IN MOST INSTANCES PCF POLICY IS SUPPORTIVE OF OR AT LEAST COMPATIBLE WITH SOVIET AIMS.

8. THE US -- DESPITE SOME CRITICISMS OF SOVIET POLICY, THE US REMAINS THE PCF'S NUMBER ONE WHIPPING-BOY. THE US REPRESENTS ALL THE PRINCIPAL BOGEYMEN FOR FRENCH COMMUNISTS: THE FAULTS OF CAPITALISM, HEGEMONY OVER WESTERN EUROPE, INHIBITION OF FRENCH INDEPENDENCE

THROUGH MAINTENANCE OF A POLITICAL BLOC, ETC. EVEN WHEN US AND PCF POLICIES APPARENTLY COINCIDE, SUCH AS ON SOME ASPECTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS, THE PCF STUDIOUSLY AVOIDS CREDITING THE US WITH FOLLOWING A CORRECT POLICY. THERE IS NO REASON TO EXPECT THIS TO CHANGE SHOULD THE PCF BE INCLUDED IN A LEFTIST GOVERNMENT.

9. NUCLEAR WEAPONS -- THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE PCF DECIDED IN JUNE THAT THE INDEPENDENT FRENCH NUCLEAR FORCE SHOULD BE MAINTAINED AND MODERNIZED AS CONFIDENTIAL

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TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANCES OCCUR. THE PARTY EXPLAINED THAT IT HAD OPPOSED THE DEVELOPMENT OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS, BUT THAT THESE WERE NOW A FACT OF LIFE; AND IT COMPLAINED THAT THE GISCARD GOVERNMENT HAD PERMITTED CONVENTIONAL FORCES TO DETERIORATE TO THE POINT WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE THE ONLY VALID DEFENSE. THE PCF ARGUES THAT FRANCE SHOULD MAINTAIN THE STRICT MINIMUM OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS NECESSARY FOR ITS DEFENSE, WHICH CURRENTLY TRANSLATES INTO CONSTRUCTION OF A SIXTH BALLISTIC-MISSILE FIRING NUCLEAR SUBMARINE, BUT NON-REPLACEMENT OF THE MIRAGE IV BOMBER WHEN IT BECOMES OBSOLETE. SEVERAL ASPECTS OF PCF NUCLEAR POLICY REMAIN UNCLEAR -- SUCH AS THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FORCE DE FRAPPE AND FRANCE'S COMMITMENTS UNDER THE ATLANTIC TREATY. IN ADDITION, SEVERAL FEATURES OF THE PCF'S STANCE

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ARE UNHELPFUL FROM THE US VIEWPOINT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE COMMUNISTS INSIST THAT FRENCH NUCLEAR STRATEGY SHOULD BE ONE OF "DETERRENCE" AND NOT "FORWARD DEFENSE", AND THAT THE GAULLIST "TOUS AZIMUTS" PRINCIPLE SHOULD BE REINSTATED. THUS THEY WOULD REVIEW CURRENT TARGETING AND PRESUMABLY MAKE IT MORE NEUTRALIST. THE OMINOUS IMPLICATION IS THAT SOME POTENTIAL US TARGETS WOULD BE IDENTIFIED TO OFFSET SOVIET ONES. THE PCF OPPOSES TARGETTING ON POPULATION CENTERS, THUS UNDERCUTTING THE DETERRENT VALUE OF FRENCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PCF ALSO ADVOCATES ESTABLISHING A COMMITTEE, INCLUDING ALL GOVERNMENT PARTIES, TO BE RESPONSIBLE FOR DECISIONS ON ACTUAL USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, THUS GIVING THEMSELVES A VETO OVER SUCH USE IF THE PCF WERE INCLUDED IN A GOVERNING COALITION.

10. DISARMAMENT -- GENERAL, UNIVERSAL AND CONTROLLED

DISARMAMENT IS A FUNDAMENTAL OBJECTIVE OF THE COMMON PROGRAM OF THE LEFT, AND HAS FOR A LONG TIME ALSO BEEN BASIC TO THE PCF'S FOREIGN POLICY. THUS THE PCF ADVOCATES JOINING NEGOTIATIONS ON MBFR AND THE GENEVA CCD, OPPOSES NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION, AND SUPPORTS A VARIETY OF ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVES, INCLUDING SOME WHICH WOULD GIVE THE EAST UNILATERAL ADVANTAGES, SUCH AS THE WARSAW PACT PROPOSAL FOR A TREATY ON NON-FIRST-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THE PCF WOULD ASSOCIATE FRANCE WITH THE US-SOVIET ACCORD ON PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, AND WOULD EVENTUALLY SEEK A FRENCH ROLE IN THE SALT NEGOTIATIONS.

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11. THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY -- THE PCF'S ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EC IS SIMILAR TO ITS POLICY TOWARD THE ATLANTIC ALLIANCE: GRUDGING ACCEPTANCE. THE COMMITMENT TO RESPECT FRANCE'S EXISTING ALLIANCES WOULD ALSO APPLY TO ITS MEMBERSHIP IN THE EC. HOWEVER, THE LONG-TERM PCF OBJECTIVE OF DOING AWAY WITH BLOCS AND CREATING A EUROPE WHICH EXTENDS FROM THE ATLANTIC TO THE URALS, (THE PCF HAS NOT ACTUALLY ADOPTED DE GAULLE'S PHRASE) SUGGESTS THAT THE PARTY'S EFFORTS WITHIN THE COMMUNITY WOULD BE AIMED NOT TOWARD STRENGTHENING IT AND GIVING IT A UNIFIED POLITICAL DIMENSION BUT TOWARD GRADUALLY BREAKING DOWN BARRIERS TO BROADER PAN-EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AS THE FRAMEWORK FOR AN INDEPENDENT FRANCE. IN ADDITION, THE PCF HAS FOR YEARS DECLARED THAT IT WOULD WORK AGAINST "THE MONOPOLY CAPITALIST ORIENTATION" OF THE EC. LAST APRIL, IN ANOTHER EVOLUTION OF PCF ATTITUDES, MARCHAIS ANNOUNCED THAT THE PCF WOULD NOT OPPOSE DIRECT ELECTION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT IF THERE WERE GUARANTEES IN THE ELECTORAL LAW THAT FRENCH DEPUTIES COULD NOT EXCEED THE PROVISIONS OF EXISTING EC TREATIES. THIS CHANGE, WHILE APPEARING TO SUGGEST THAT THE PCF POSITION ON THE POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE EC COULD EVOLVE FURTHER IN THE FUTURE, WAS EVIDENTLY MADE FOR DOMESTIC ELECTORAL REASONS AND PROBABLY HAS LITTLE EFFECT ON THE PCF'S BASICALLY ANTI-EC LINE.

12. CSCE -- THE PCF SEES CSCE AS A VEHICLE FOR ADVANCEMENT OF ITS PAN-EUROPEAN CONCEPTIONS, BASED ON NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY, NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS, HUMAN RIGHTS, PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE, AND INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION. THE PARTY SUPPORTS

APPLICATION OF ALL ASPECTS OF THE HELSINKI FINAL ACT
-- A "MOTHERHOOD" PHRASE WHICH MATCHES THE SOVIET
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LINE. IN A LEFTIST COALITION GOVERNMENT THE PCF
COULD BE EXPECTED TO FAVOR STRENGTHENING THE CSCE AND
MAKING IT INTO THE PREEMINENT MULTILATERAL EUROPEAN
INSTITUTION. IN FACT, THE PCF ADVOCATES THE CONCLUSION
OF A "EUROPEAN SECURITY TREATY OPEN TO ALL INTERESTED
STATES" - AGAIN A SOVIET PLOY DIRECTED AT WEAKENING
WESTERN SUPPORT FOR NATO.

13. HUMAN RIGHTS -- JUDGING FROM ITS DECLARATIONS
OVER SEVERAL YEARS, THE PCF INTENDS TO MAINTAIN A
STRONG POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THUS IMPLYING
CONTINUING FRICTION WITH MOSCOW. L'HUMANITE'S BITTER
FRONT-PAGE CONDEMNATION OF THE TRIAL OF CZECH
DISSIDENT INTELLECTUALS FOLLOWED A REFUSAL OF A
CZECH VISA FOR ONE OF ITS JOURNALISTS WHO WISHED
TO COVER THE TRIAL. GIVEN GISCARD'S MORE CAUTIOUS

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APPROACH ON HUMAN RIGHTS, THE HUMANITE ARTICLE PLACES THE PCF IN AN APPARENTLY TOUGHER STANCE ON THIS ISSUE THAN THAT OF THE EXISTING CENTER-RIGHT GOVERNMENT. PART OF THE PCF'S ATTITUDE IS UNDOUBTEDLY IMAGE BUILDING, BUT THE FRENCH LEFT HAS ADOPTED HUMAN RIGHTS AS ONE OF ITS BASIC POLICY PLANKS, AND THE PCF HAS TAKEN IT UP STRONGLY IN ORDER TO PROVE ITS WESTERN AND DEMOCRATIC CREDENTIALS.

14. OTHER ISSUES -- ON INTERNATIONAL ISSUES LESS DIRECTLY TIED TO FRENCH OR EUROPEAN CONCERNS SUCH AS AFRICA, THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE MEDITERRANEAN -- PCF POLICY TENDS TO ADHERE TO CONVENTIONAL PRO-SOVIET VIEWS: OPPOSITION TO THE REMNANTS OF COLONIALISM, AND SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS AND REGIMES. THE PCF REJECTS ON IDEOLOGICAL GROUNDS THE CONCEPT OF A NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE BETWEEN INDUSTRIALIZED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.

15. CONCLUSIONS -- THE CHANGES WHICH HAVE TAKEN PLACE IN THE PCF'S POSITIONS ON FOREIGN POLICY
I
ISSUES SUGGEST THAT THE PARTY IS SLOWLY MOVING CLOSER TO THE MAINSTREAM OF FRENCH THINKING ON INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. HOWEVER, POLICY CHANGES HAVE COME ONLY AFTER A SECRETIVE PROCESS WITHIN THE

PARTY WHICH HAS IN ITSELF RECALLED TO THE
FRENCH PUBLIC THE PCF'S STALINIST PAST AND ITS CONTIN-
UING ADHERENCE TO MOSCOW'S APPROACH TO THE
COMMUNIST PRINCIPLE OF DEMOCRATIC
CENTRALISM (I.E., LITTLE DEMOCRACY, LOTS OF
CENTRALISM). IN ADDITION, THE MOST SIGNIFICANT
CONFIDENTIAL

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ALTERATIONS HAVE TAKEN PLACE ON JUST THOSE POLICIES
WHICH HAD SUSTAINED THE IMAGE OF THE PCF
AS BEING UNDER THE STRONG INFLUENCE OF MOSCOW,
E.G. HUMAN RIGHTS, ATTITUDES TOWARD NATO AND THE EC.
THUS THE QUESTION REMAINS WHETHER THIS PARTIAL
EVOLUTION OF THE PCF'S FOREIGN POLICY IS NO MORE
THAN A TACTICAL SHIFT TO IMPROVE ITS IMAGE WITH
FRENCH VOTERS OR WHETHER IT CARRIES THE SEEDS OF
A LONG-TERM MODERATION IN PCF ATTITUDES.
OVER THE NEAR TERM, HOWEVER, THERE IS NO PHILOSOPHICAL
DILEMMA FOR US INTERESTS, FOR THE DEMONSTRABLE FACT
IS THAT, DESPITE SOME ASPECTS OF CHANGE, THE PCF'S
FOREIGN POLICY REMAINS THE MOST INIMICAL TO US
INTERESTS OF ALL MAJOR FRENCH POLITICAL PARTIES, AND
CARRIES WITH IT GRAVE DOUBTS OVER THE DIRECTIONS
IN WHICH THE PARTY, IF IT HAD A ROLE IN GOVERNMENT,
WOULD SEEK TO MOVE FRANCE.
HARTMAN

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PARTY LINE, ELECTIONS, COMMUNISTS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 16 jan 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978PARIS01304
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780023-0393
Format: TEL
From: PARIS
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780159/aaaabxwww.tel
Line Count: 686
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: eb8d63e3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 13
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 27 apr 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 3768212
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: ELECTIONS 1978: THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE FRENCH COMMUNIST PARTY
TAGS: PINT, FR
To: STATE USEEC
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odb://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/eb8d63e3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014